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I. INTRODUCTION
In form, the income tax applies to economic outcomes, not prospects. It
purports to distinguish economic winners and losers.' If I buy an ounce of
gold today and sell in one year, my tax bill depends on how much I gain or
lose. My initial investment in gold is relevant but only as a baseline, used to
measure my ultimate gain or loss.
In substance, though, income taxes may not weigh on outcomes at all.
The "taxation-of-risk" model challenges the idea that the income tax can
effectively distinguish winners and losers,2 claiming that taxing income
(i.e., outcomes) is no different from taxing starting wealth (i.e., prospects).
First developed in the 1940s to describe investor behavior,3 the model has
I Cf Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARv. L.
REv. 1575, 1601 (1979) ("[L]ucky gamblers are not the same as unlucky gamblers"); see
also David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAx L. REv. 1, 27 (2004) (quoting
Graetz in the context of taxation of risk).
2 See Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective,
47 NAT'L TAx J. 789 (1994); Weisbach, supra note 1.
3 Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-
Taking, 58 Q. J. EcoN. 388 (1944).
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been deployed recently to support proposals for fundamental4 and
incremental tax reform. 5 The income tax certainly burdens a winning
investment with a higher tax bill. But, it aids a losing investment with a loss
deduction, which potentially reduces taxes on other activities. By aiding
losers and burdening winners, the income tax shifts some investment risk
from investors to the government and makes a risky investment (e.g., an
ounce of gold) less risky.
Investors can reverse this risk sharing by taking on more investment
risk. In other words, they can "opt out" of taxes. An investor who would
have bought a single ounce of gold absent the income tax would buy more.
To fund the additional purchase, the investor might borrow (and pay
interest) or liquidate low-risk assets (and forgo interest). Either way, the
cost of opting out comes from interest applied to starting wealth. Parts II,
III, and IV develop this result, which I will call the "classic model." The
main finding is that the cost to opt out is fixed and based on starting wealth,
not on actual gains or losses. Under the classic model, the investor would be
indifferent between a wealth tax and an income tax.
The classic model, though, looks only at individual taxpayers. It does
not press the important policy issue: is the government indifferent between
wealth and income taxes? Part V suggests that the answer is "no." To opt
out of the income tax, an investor must increase her investment risk. She
could buy more of the investment (e.g., more gold), or she could increase
her exposure to the investment with a derivatives contract (e.g., forward
contract on gold). Either way, she must find a counterparty to supply the
additional risk, and the counterparty has her own tax consequences. Part V
shows that a wealth tax and an income tax produce the same public revenue
only in one narrow and unlikely circumstance-when the government itself
acts as counterparty to the investor who ops out. Private investors, acting
without government cooperation, may affect their own private returns. They
will not, however, transform overall income-tax revenue into wealth-tax
revenue.
If the classic model does not address the ultimate goal of taxation-
raising money for the fisc-then what does it do? Part VI shows that the
classic model allows us to estimate the burdens of taxation as felt by
4 See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and
a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter? 47 TAx L. REv. 377 (1992); Noel
B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAx L.
REv. 17 (1996); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L.
REv. 423 (2000); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income
Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAx L. REv. 1 (1996).
5 See, e.g., Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and The Tax Benefit of Deferred
Compensation, 62 Tax L. Rev. 377 (2009).
488 [Vol. 32:485
Extending the Taxation-of-Risk Model
individual taxpayers ex ante. This result, in turn, lets us estimate just how
much distortion an income tax has on investment decisions (at least when
compared with a wealth tax). In other words, the classic model is perfectly
plausible as a model of private behavior even if it breaks down as a model
of public revenue. According to the classic model, the income tax does not
impose higher or lower burdens on investments based on risk or expected
return. As a normative matter, this result is highly desirable as we should
hope that taxes do not interfere with economic decisions, like investing in
high or low risk assets.
Part VII shows, however, that this happy result fails as we begin to
account for strategic behavior by investors. The classic model assumes that
investors receive a significant tax benefit for losses but do not behave
strategically by timing their gains and losses. If investors can accelerate (or
"harvest") their losses and defer gain, they hold a "timing option" with
respect to taxes. With higher risk, losses (and gains) are more likely. Thus,
timing options give investors a reason to prefer risky assets.
Policymakers understand that timing options threaten the fisc, and they
respond by limiting loss deductions. In general, investors in the United
States must match their capital losses against their capital gains. If they
have no capital gains, they must defer their capital losses until they can
match losses against gains. If they never have gains, they never deduct their
losses. Part VIII shows how loss limitations not only counter timing options
but create a new problem. They cause investors to disfavor risky assets
because losses may not be fully usable.
Dissatisfied by the deferral opportunities of realization-based taxes and
the distortions just described, many commentators would prefer to tax gains
and losses on an annual basis, regardless of whether investors "realize" gain
or loss with a sale. Part IX shows that the taxation-of-risk model extends to
accretion taxes as well. Because taxpayers can opt out of accretion taxes,
they may not be inherently fairer or better reflective of income than
realization taxes. Both reduce to a charge that the investor may prepay.
II. THE TAXATION-OF-RISK MODEL HAS DEFENSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS
A. Introduction
Ultimately, this article will interpret the taxation-of-risk model as
identifying the private cost of opting out of taxation. We first identify the
nature of the tax system under consideration. Doing so will involve
assumptions, some of which are "unrealistic" in that they do not reflect an
actual tax system. The Internal Revenue Code, for example, limits the
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ability of taxpayers to deduct capital losses 6 while the taxation-of-risk
model assumes that losses and gains receive symmetrical treatment.7 This
article will have much more to say about losses below and indeed develops
a more complex model that accounts for loss limitations.8
Even without the more complex models, the simple model supplies
theoretical value that describes the basic structure of taxes. At the heart of
the actual income tax, with all of its political ugliness and administrative
concessions, lie a few theoretical ideals. Taxpayers should pay tax on the
amount of gain they have. True economic losses should reduce tax liability.
This part seeks to model these lofty ideals, unobscured by political
compromise or administrative necessity.
B. The Path of an Asset Value in a World Without Tax
We will model the tax consequences to an investor of holding an asset
(or entering into a derivatives contract) over some period. Let us specify
that the period lasts T years, running from time = 0 to time = T The initial
value of the asset is So. When the investor sells, it is worth ST. This article
uses an arrow to show how an investor's wealth changes over time. In a tax-
free world, we simply say
(1) so -S
Note that we do not actually need to specify much about ST, other than
to note that it is "random." The asset could be anything: an ounce of gold, a
share of Facebook stock, etc. So is the value today (time = 0), and ST is the
value at some time in the future (time = 7). When describing assets, we
usually think of both So and ST as being positive. A huge swath of
investment activity, however, does not follow this restriction. Derivatives
contracts often involve no up-front investment (So = 0) but can have a future
value, ST, that is either negative or positive.9
C. A Simple Income Tax and Model
1. Investors Have a Fixed Holding Period
For now, we will assume that investor sells the asset at time = T. Ex
6 See I.R.C. § 1211.
7 See infra part II.C.4.
8 See infra part VIII.
9 See infra part V.B.
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ante, the value of the asset upon sale, ST, is not known. The holding period
until sale (T itself) is known. For example, a taxpayer may buy an ounce of
gold planning to hold it for ten years, but the investor has no way of
knowing the price of gold in ten years.
Assuming a fixed holding period may seem rigid, and we will relax it
later. The assumption is useful, though, for two reasons. Specifying the
holding period up front allows us to determine the cost of taxes up front.
Moreover, a fixed holding period precludes strategic behavior known as
"timing options" that allows taxpayers to accelerate losses and defer gains.
2. Investors Face Tax Consequences Only at the End of This Holding
Period
All tax consequences arise at time = T when the investor sells. This
"realization" method of taxation is the worldwide standard for taxing the
increase or decrease in the value of investment assets.10 Investors do,
however, pay tax on dividends and interest when received. For now, we
will assume that the asset pays no dividends, interest, or the like. 12
3. The Government Imposes Tax at a Flat Marginal Rate
In examples, this article assumes that the government imposes a flat tax
of twenty or fifty percent. When formalizing results, it expresses the rate as
r. The taxation-of-risk model remains viable when extended to varying rates
of taxation (e.g., on different asset classes) 13and to progressive taxation.14
4. The Government Treats Gains and Losses Symmetrically
Under a fifty percent tax rate, $100 of gain produces a $50 tax. Under
the taxation-of-risk model, a $100 loss produces a $50 tax benefit. The
government shares in both the return and the risks of private investment.
The model assumes that gains and losses receive symmetrical treatment.
U.S. tax laws are not, however, symmetrical, because taxpayers face limits
10 See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 232 (3d
ed. 2010).
" Cf, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a)(4)-(6) (including interest, rents, royalties, and dividends in
gross income).
12 But cf infra part IX (extending the model to annual accretion taxation).
13 See David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates, 57
NAT'L TAX J. 229 (2004).
14 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-Bearing
Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879 (2006).
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on their ability to deduct losses. Arguably, these limits are administrative
requirements, imposed in order to control strategic behavior. But for the
presence of strategic behavior, taxpayers should receive loss deductions. As
we initially preclude strategic behavior, we can also assume that losses
receive symmetrical treatment.
We can now describe the path that starting wealth takes under the
simple tax. As in a world without tax, our investor starts with an asset worth
So7and holds an asset worth ST at time = T. At that time, the investor sells
and faces a flat tax rate of r (a placeholder for 20%, 50%, etc.). If there is a
gain, the investor pays tax of (ST - So) r If there is a loss, the investor
receives a symmetrical tax benefit of (So - ST) T We could equivalently say
that the investor always "pays" the government (ST - So) , but that this
"payment" is negative if there is a loss.
After taxes, our investor's starting wealth of So faces a different "path"
than the one in a tax-free world:
(2) so -ST-(ST -S,)r(2)ST (1 - .) + S,,7
This expression shows that the investor no longer enjoys full ownership of
the asset after tax. In particular, note that ending wealth is less sensitive to
Sr, the value of the asset at the end of the holding period. In a tax-free
world, the investor's ending wealth is ST. In a taxable world, the correlation
is diminished to only a portion of asset's final value.
5. The Cost of Funding Additional Asset Purchases Is Measured
byInterest Rates
The model will later show that investors can preemptively offset (or
"opt out" of) tax by increasing their exposure to the risky investment asset
considered above. Of course, the investor must find funding for the
additional exposure to the asset. Suppose that the risky asset considered
above is gold. How does the investor get more gold? The investor could
shift funds out of cash holdings (like money market funds and certificates
of deposit) and into the risky investment asset. Low-risk assets typically
bear interest, which the investor would forego in order to buy the risky
investment asset. Or, the investor could borrow additional funds, paying
whatever interest rate the market demands. The two methods are equivalent
so long as the rates to borrow and to lend are equivalent.
15 See infra part VIII.A. (discussing reasons for loss limitations).
16 See id.
17 Cf supra part II.B. (describing a tax-free world).
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If rates are not equivalent, we would expect investors to pursue the
cheaper route. An investor holding cash yielding 2% a year should not
borrow at 8% a year to fund additional asset purchases. She should simply
liquidate the 2%-interest-bearing asset to buy more of the risky asset. The
"cost" of buying the risky asset is foregone interest of 2% a year.18 Even if
the investor never actually owned the low-risk 2% asset, it nevertheless
represents the opportunity cost of the risky investment, the assured rate of
interest the investor could otherwise receive. Current rates are historically
low. Short-term U.S. Treasury securities yield almost no interest;19 LIBOR
(a rate financial institutions pay each other) ranges from next to nothing for
daily rates to about one percent for yearly rates.20
This article will follow two simplifying conventions when describing
the cost of buying more of the risky asset. First, we will usually say that the
investor "borrows" funds to make the purchase. We could equivalently say
that the investor liquidates existing low-risk assets, but the idea of
borrowing is more direct and vivid. Both approaches are equivalent so long
as we make the simplifying assumption that the interest rates for borrowing
and investing are the same. Second, we will specify the rates as being after
tax and assume that interest received is taxable and that interest paid is
deductible.21 While published rates are almost always subject to tax, the
true measure of the cost of buying a risky asset is what the investor would
have received, after tax, by investing in cash. Examples use an after-tax rate
of 2%. In models, this article will use an after-tax rate of r.22
6. Taxes Do Not Affect Asset Prices
We will disregard the effects of taxes on asset prices. In other words,
18 For large financial institutions, the rates for borrowing and lending are roughly the
same. Usually they may borrow or lend at something like the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), a very low rate comparable to the risk-free rate on U.S. Treasury securities. See
JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 77 (8th ed. 2012).
19 In April 2012, one month Treasury notes yield 0.05%, and thirty-year Treasury
bonds yield 3.35%. See Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/
Pages/TextView.aspx?data-yield (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
20 SeeLIBOR, Other Interest Rate Indexes, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.
bankrate.com/rates/interest-rates/libor.aspx (last updated Feb. 13, 2013).
21 Cf I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (including interest in gross income) and I.R.C. § 163(a)
(allowing a deduction for interest paid). This is similar to the assumption about the
deductibility and includability of gains and losses. See supra part II.C.4.
22 Under a tax rate of r, the before tax interest rate would be r / (1 - r). Under a 50%
tax, a pre-tax rate of 4% implies an after-tax rate of 2%. Under a 20% tax, a pre-tax rate of
2.5% implies an after-tax rate of 2%.
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the asset price goes from So to ST regardless of taxation. This assumption
helps us compare results for an investor operating in a taxable and a tax-free
world. We will revisit this assumption later. 23
III. A SIMPLE TAX EXEMPTS SIDE BETS (INCLUDING MANY DERIVATIVES
CONTRACTS)
In this article, a "side bet" is some contract that initially has no value
but can take either a positive or a negative value in the future. A wager is a
simple example. An optimist, Ophelia, and a pessimist, Pete, decide to
wager on the price of gold in one year. Ophelia thinks it will go up, and
Pete thinks it will go down. They agree that the loser will pay the winner
$100. In a tax-free world, the wager involves only Ophelia and Pete.
Taxes introduce a third party, the government, into the wager. Suppose
the government imposes a 50% tax. The loser still pays the winner $100.
But now, the winner pays a $50 tax to the government, and the loser
receives a tax benefit worth $50. In this case, the government's tax claim
adds nothing to the public revenue. The government receives $50 from the







Receives from Wimner $50 Receives from Loser $100
Pays to Loser $50 Pays to Govenunent $50
Nets -$0- Nets +$50
The tax gives the government nothing and merely alters Pete and
Ophelia's deal. Pete and Ophelia can easily undo even these effects. In a
23 See infra part V.C; see also Kaplow, supra note 2.
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tax-free world, they agreed to a $100 transfer. In 50%-tax world, they
achieve the same result by doubling their bet. The winner receives $200
from the loser, but pays half to the government. The loser pays $200 to the
winner, but receives a tax benefit of $100 from the government. As a result,
we can say that Pete, Ophelia, and the government are all indifferent to the






Receives $100 Receives $200
Pays $100 Pays $100
Nets -$0- Nets +$100
Let us now generalize this result. Parties facing a tax of r can opt out of
the tax by increasing the amount covered by the contract up by a percentage
amount of r / (1 - r). We have seen the results for a 50% tax applied to
$100 desired bet already. Under a 20% tax and $100 desired bet, Pete and
Ophelia increase their bet by 0.20 / (1 - 0.20) or 25%. The loser pays the
winner $125. The winner pays the government 20% or $25. The loser
receives a tax benefit of $25. The final result mirrors the tax-free world.
The winner gets $100, the loser loses $100, and the government gets
nothing. This general gross up factor, of r / (1 - r), is the back-bone for
more sophisticated opt-out transactions discussed throughout this article.
The result may have practical implications for the taxation of
derivatives. 24 Many forms of derivatives contracts-including futures,
forwards, and swaps-are side bets that have no initial value to either
party25 much like Ophelia and Pete's wager on the price of gold. Indeed, we
24 See generally David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation ofFinancial Instruments:
An Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1886 (2004).
25 Options, though, involve the payment of a premium, making it more like an asset
than a side bet.
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could readily characterize their wager as itself a derivatives contract.26 The
market for derivatives contracts is staggeringly large. The value of world-
wide derivatives contracts, excluding those traded on exchanges, is
estimated at over $21 trillion,27 50% larger than either the entire U.S.
economy or its public debt.28 The proper tax treatment of derivatives has
baffled policymakers and scholars for at least two decades. 29The analysis of
Pete and Ophelia suggests, however, a conceivable solution of exempting
certain derivatives contracts from taxation altogether.
IV. INVESTORS CAN OPT OUT OF THE SIMPLE TAX ON INVESTMENTS BY
PAYING A FIXED CHARGE
A. Opting Out
1. Achieving the Results froma Tax-Free World
The prior part dealt with side bets, and we saw that investors can
readily opt out of taxation without cost. We now extend this result to actual
investment assets. The basic concept remains the same. As with the side
bet, investors must increase their exposure to the risky investment. The only
difference is that, now, the investor must pay some interest charge to
achieve the desired result.
We should make a few more formal notes about the desired result. In
equation (1), we described how an asset would move in value in a tax-free
world. An investor starts with So and ends with ST. In equation (2), we saw
how a simple tax affects the investor. The government shares in the
investor's gain or loss. This part describes how an investor might "opt out"
of the tax system as described in part II.C. By opting out, I simply mean
26 Ophelia has written a "cash-or-nothing put" on gold. If gold drops below its current
price, she pays $100. Pete has written a "cash-or-nothing call" on gold. If gold rises above its
current price, he pays $100. The exchange of contracts between Ophelia and Pete would be
financially "fair" if interest rates are zero. See HULL, supra note 18, at 581-82.
27 See Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, BANK OF
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 2012), http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/ dtl920a.pdf.
28 See The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURY DIRECT,
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application-np (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
Similarly, the U.S. gross domestic product for 2010 was $14.76 trillion. See National Income
and Product Accounts Tables: Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic Product, BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqlD= 9&step=1 (last revised Jan. 30,
2013).
29 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., JCX-56-1 1, PRESENT LAW AND
ISSUES RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND PRODUCTSI (Comm.
Print 2011).
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that the investor wants to offset the risk-sharing inherent in income
taxation. To the extent possible, the investor will try to bear the full gains
and losses inherent in the asset So.
2. Opting Out with Zero Interest Rates
To highlight the role of interest rates in opting out, we initially suppose
that interest rates are zero. Suppose that Ophelia owns an ounce of actual
gold, worth $1000.30 She plans on holding the gold for one year before
selling. At the time of sale, she faces a simple 50% tax, under the
assumptions described earlier. She will keep only half of her gains, but will
bear only half of her losses. We focus on two scenarios for now. Gold
might rise or fall by 20%.31 Absent any adjustment, Ophelia enjoys the
following returns after tax:
* If gold rises to $1200 per ounce, she keeps only $100 of her
$200 gain. She has $1100 after tax.
* If gold falls to $800, she bears only $100 of her $200 loss. She
has $900 after tax.
In effect, the government becomes a mandatory partner, sharing in half
of all gains and losses32 of Ophelia's gold. The government's interest does
not, however, extend to Ophelia's initial capital of $1000.
Ophelia wants to nullify the tax, and the classic taxation-of-risk model
gives her a way to do so. As in the prior subsection, she doubles her
investment. She simply borrows $1000 for a year and buys another ounce of
gold. For now, assume that she need not pay any interest.
* Gold rises to $1200 per ounce. Ophelia's two ounces are worth
$2400. She pays a $200 tax on her $400 of gain, and repays her
lender $1000. She is left with $1200.
* Gold falls to $800 per ounce. Ophelia's two ounces are worth
$1600. She takes a deduction worth $200 because of her $400
loss. After she repays her lender, she is left with $800.
Whether gold goes up or down, Ophelia has an after-tax payoff equal
to the value of one ounce of gold, her result in a tax-free world. She has
effectively opted out of the tax.
30 This amount is used for ease of presentation.
31 In rough terms, we can think of this as representing a standard deviation of twenty
percent. This is roughly the current market volatility for gold. See CBOE Delayed Market
Quotes, CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, http://www.cboe.com/DelayedQuote/
SimpleQuote.aspx?ticker-GVZ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
32 See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINEss STRATEGY 3 (3d ed. 2009).
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3. Opting Out with Positive Interest Rates
Our results are only slightly different with positive interest rates.
Suppose that the prevailing interest rate is 2% (after tax).33 To borrow the
$1000 to finance her additional gold purchase, she would need to pay after-
tax interest of $20. Or, she could liquidate $1000 of her risk-free assets,
foregoing the certainty of $20 worth of after-tax interest. In either case,
Ophelia must pay $20, or 2% of her additional investment, to opt out of the
tax system. Beyond this fixed interest payment, her results are precisely the
same as in the prior subsection. The opt-out transaction works no matter
how risky gold is or where gold prices go next year. In one year, Ophelia
will have wealth equal to the value of one ounce of gold (her result absent
taxes) less $20. Ophelia simply pays (or forgoes) interest on $1000 (the
initial value of an ounce of gold).
B. Retrospective Cost of Opting Out
We now formalize the result from the prior section. Doing so is not just
an exercise in algebra. It allows us to extend the simple opt-out transaction
to more complex tax regimes.
Recall that, if the investor does not opt out, the tax causes her initial
asset to follow the path specified in equation (2).
(3) so Sy(1 - T) + Sof
Note that, on the right side of the path, the investor does not bear the
full risk and rewards of ST. She has only a portion, given by (1 - r).
1. Grossing Up Initially
To be effective, the opt-out transaction must result in the investor's
receiving every dollar of gain and bearing every dollar of loss from changes
in the value of the asset. To achieve this result, our investor needs more of
the risky asset. If the investor starts with a "grossed up" amount of So/ (1 -
r) rather than merely So, she will have the "right" amount of ST at the end
(time = ).
so ST (1 -T) + SO[
(4) 1-T 1-T
ST + T5,
33 See supra Part II.C.5.
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Our investor, however, starts with only So. She needs extra funds to
hold the grossed up amountSo/ (1 - r).The additional amount she needs is
(5) So TS
For example, if r is 20% and So is $1000, the investor would need
$1250 of the asset. She must increase her holdings by $250. She can obtain
these extra funds by borrowing or by liquidating low risk assets (like a
savings account or money market fund).
2. Repaying Later
The investor borrows the additional amount described in (5). At the end
of the holding period, the investor must repay the debt. Using continuous
compounding at an after-tax rate of r, the required repayment is-
(6) TSeTT
For example, borrowing $250 at 2% for 10 years implies a repayment
of $305.35. Similarly, if the investor liquidated a low-risk asset yielding
2%, she has forgone owning an asset that would be worth $305.35 in 10
years.
The investor's final (time = 7) wealth will be the value of the grossed-
up asset after tax (given by the left side of the arrow in (4)) less the amount






Based on this result, we can say that the opt-out transaction leads to the
following path for an asset to follow after tax:
(8) so - ST -
We can compare the result in (1)(8) with the no-tax world described in
(1). In (1), the investor is subject to no tax and has ending wealth of ST. In
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(1)(8), our investor faces a tax of r but privately "opts out" of the tax. Her
ending wealth is ST less the following amount-
(9) So(e" - 1)r
We can describe the amount in (1)(9) as the retrospective cost of opting
out of taxes, the fixed cost of avoiding the impact of taxes, payable at time
= T What makes this retrospective cost interesting is that it does not depend
at all on the final value of the asset, ST. The cost depends on the initial
value, the tax rate, interest rates, and the holding period. This result is the
core of the classical "taxation of risk" model.
4. Example
Suppose our investor starts with an asset worth $1000. She faces a 20%
tax, 2% after-tax cost of borrowing, and a 10-year holding period. Her
retrospective cost should be $55.35. To see that this is correct, suppose that
the asset could go up or down by 50% over the 10 years. In a tax-free
world, she would have either $1500 or $500 at the end of 10 years. By
opting out of tax, she would have the same amounts less the $55.35
retrospective cost. Depending on the performance of the asset, she will have
either $1444.65 or $444.65.
* The investor grosses up to $1250, per (4). This amount will rise
or fall by 50%.
* To obtain this amount, she borrows $250 (or liquidates low-risk
investments).At the end of 10 years, she repays debt of $305.35,
regardless of whether the asset goes up or down.
* If the grossed-up asset goes up by 50%, it is worth $1875. She
has gain of $625 and pays tax of 20% or $125. The asset
($1875) less the tax bill ($125) less the debt repayment
($3050.35) leaves her with $1444.65, just as we predicted.
* If the grossed asset goes down by 50%, it is worth $625. She
has a loss of the same amount and receives a tax benefit worth
20% of her loss or $125. The asset ($625) plus the tax benefit
($125) less the debt repayment ($305.35) leaves her with
$444.65, just as we predicted.
C. Prospective Cost of Opting Out
The prior subsection described opting out in terms of paying a charge
at the end of the holding period. This description best captures the idea of
opting out of a realization tax because it shows the investor may opt out
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indefinitely. The investor grosses up her holdings until she decides to sell in
the future. Ultimately, she might sell in one year, ten years, or whenever.
The cost of the opt-out transaction grows over time, but that cost will
depend only on the starting wealth, the holding period, and the interest rate.
The cost does not depend on the ending value of the asset.
If the investor knows her holding period up front, she can prospectively
determine the cost of opting out. Above, (9) gave the retrospective cost
(incurred , at time = T) of opting out. The investor could conceptually
"prepay" this amount at time = 0. Using continuous compounding, we
discount the retrospective cost to present value by multiplying by e-rT. Thus,
the prospective cost is-
T T(10) SO(e - 1) Te- = S.(1 - e -T)
To see that this works, return to the example just given. Our investor
starts with an asset worth $1000. She faces a 20% tax, 2% after-tax interest,
and a 10-year holding period. Previously, we found her retrospective cost of
opting out would be $55.35. The prospective cost, incurred at time = 0, is
$45.32. To see why, again suppose that the asset could go up or down by
50% over the ten years. In a tax-free world, an initial investment of $1000
would be either $1500 or $500 at the end of ten years. By prospectively
opting out of tax, she starts with an initial investment of $1000 plus the
$45.32 cost, or $1045.32. She ends with an investment equal to her results
in a tax-free world ($1500 or $500).
* The investor grosses up from $1045.32 to $1250. This amount
will rise or fall by 50%.
* To obtain this amount, she borrows $204.68 (or liquidates low-
risk investments). At the end of 10 years, she repays debt
of$250, regardless of whether the asset goes up or down.
* If the grossed-up asset goes up by 50%, it is worth $1875. She
has gain of $625 and pays tax of 20% or $125. The asset
($1875) less the tax bill ($125) less the debt repayment ($250)
leaves her with $1500, the same as a tax-free world.
* If the grossed asset goes down by 50%, it is worth $625. She
has a loss of the same amount and receives a tax benefit worth
20% of her loss or $125. The asset ($625) plus the tax benefit
($125) less the debt repayment ($305.35) leaves her with $500,
the same as a tax-free world.
D. Incentives to Opt Out
Up to now, the model has described the ability to opt out of taxes. The
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simple tax described above34 mandates risk sharing between an investor
like Ophelia and the government. Lower risk, though, will lower Ophelia's
expected return, something she may not want. In responses, Ophelia may
simply take on more risk through leverage or reallocating her portfolio.
Do investors actually respond to taxes in this way? The original work
on the taxation of risk mainly concerned itself with investor behavior.35 It
may be impossible to know empirically. A randomized experiment can
hardly compare tax-free and taxable worlds, and the model developed so far
is quite idealized. It does not reflect the administrative concessions and
ugliness found in real tax systems. The question of whether taxpayers
would actually opt out asks us to predict and compare behavior in two
purely hypothetical worlds (a tax-free world and one with a simple tax).
The simple model does, though, make it seem fairly straightforward
and cheap for an investor to undo the risk-sharing that comes from the
simple tax. Even if average investors do not explicitly understand the
model, they might adapt their behaviors over time to the risk-sharing
inherent in the simple tax. More importantly, the ability to opt out may tell
us much about how taxes affect investor behavior. The "classic" taxation of
risk model developed so far shows that the cost of opting out does not
depend on the risk or expected return of assets. In this sense, the income tax
does not discriminate against risky investments.
V. EVEN UNDER THE SIMPLE TAx, THE GOVERNMENT SHARES IN GAINS
AND LOSSES FROM RISKY INVESTMENTS UNLESS IT OPTS OUT
A. Equivalence Between a Wealth Tax and an Income Tax
The prior part showed that investors could opt out of a simple tax by
paying a fixed charge based only on the value of the asset, the holding
period, and the interest rates. From the investor's perspective, opting out
converts the income tax into a wealth tax. Some scholars have seized on
this result to argue that income taxes are equivalent to wealth taxes.36 This
part cautions us when extending this seeming indifference to the
government itself.
In his classic article on the taxation of risk, Professor Louis Kaplow
identifies the criteria for deeming two systems of tax equivalent:
Two tax regimes are deemed equivalent if, for any choice of a tax
34 See generally supra part II.C.
35 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 3; see also Michael Livingston, Risky Business:
Economics, Culture and the Taxation ofHigh-Risk Activities, 48 TAx L. REv. 163 (1993).
36 See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 791.
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rate and a government portfolio under one regime, there exists a
tax rate and a government portfolio under the other regime such
that
(1) for any return that might be realized on the risky asset,
investors have the same after-tax wealth in period 1 under both
regimes;
(2) for any return that might be realized on the risky asset, the
government has the same revenue in period 1 under both regimes;
and
(3) total investment in each asset in period 0 is the same under
both regimes.37
This test is stronger than saying that investors have the ability to opt
out of income taxation. Instead, the results between a wealth tax and an
income tax must be the same, or at least potentially the same, for all parties
including the government. 38
B. Risk Suppliers and Forward Contracts
Ophelia's opt-out transaction itself can be described in terms of risk.
By taxing income, the government shares in Ophelia's gains and losses. The
income tax transfers some risk to the government. Ophelia opts out by
seeking additional risk. So far, we have assumed that she would make a
leverage purchase of an additional ounce of gold. The problem, though, is
that someone must supply Ophelia with the additional gold. This
counterparty may or may not be subject to tax. We need to account for the
counterparty's tax consequences if we want to analyze consequences to the
government. By assuming that the counterparty sells actual gold, we
complicate our inquiry. That sale may be taxable, and it produces proceeds
that the counterparty may invest in a taxable fashion.
Rather than buying an ounce of gold today with leverage, Ophelia
could enter into a forward contract to purchase an ounce of gold. A forward
contract is a sales contract to be performed at a future time. The contract
identifies the parties, the asset being sold, the future time for delivery, and
the price for the asset (the "delivery price"). Typically, no money changes
37 Id.
38 Professor Kaplow seems to accommodate potential equivalence by stating "there
exists a tax rate and a government portfolio." Id; cf infra part V.C.3 (discussing
government's entry into the market).
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hands when the parties enter into the contract. 39 Instead, the delivery price
is set so that it is initially "fair" to both parties. When the time for delivery
comes, the selling party (the "short") delivers the asset and the purchasing
party (the "long") pays the delivery price.
A fair delivery price is called the "forward price." Perhaps
counterintuitively, the forward price mainly reflects the current price of
gold and interest rates. It does not reflect expectations about the price of at
the time of delivery. If gold is currently $1000 per ounce and interest rates
are two percent per year, then the forward price for one year should be
$1020. The explanation for this result is that a forward contract is
effectively a leveraged purchase. If Ophelia borrows $1000 for a year to
buy an ounce of gold, then in one year she will (still) own an ounce of gold
but will need to repay $1020. She can possess gold by paying $1020 in one
year. The forward contract gives her the same thing: ownership of gold in
exchange for deferred payment. Thus, the forward price should equal $1020
in both cases.
A forward contract generally has no tax consequences until the parties
settle their obligations. 40 If the parties settle with actual delivery of the
underlying asset, they are treated just like any other parties to asset sale.
Alternatively, the parties might settle with a cash payment. If Ophelia
agrees to a forward price of $1020 but gold is actually $1500 in one year,
she receives $480. If gold is actually $500 in one year, she pays $520.
We will assume that Ophelia agrees to a cash-settled forward contract
on gold with a forward price of $1020. Her counterparty supplies her with
39 A party might demand collateral if worried about the other party's ability or
willingness to perform in the future. But, the collateral itself can be invested in a wide range
of liquid assets and is not an essential part of the forward contract.
40 See generally DAVID H. SHAPIRO, TAXATION OF EQUITY DERIVATIVES IfI.B.2.a (Tax
Mgmt., U.S. Income Portfolios Library No. 188, 2000). The constructive-sale rules of I.R.C.
§ 1259 create a significant exception to his rule. If an investor owns an asset that has
appreciated in value, then a forward contract to sell the asset in a later year will lock in the
investors gain. Historically, though, the courts resisted attempts by the Service to treat the
forward contract as a current sale of the asset. In the view of the courts, only an actual sale of
the underlying asset triggers tax. See id. at II.B.2.a. n.98. Section 1259 overturns this
approach by deeming the forward contract to be a constructive sale of the appreciated asset.
See id. at II.B.2.c. If the investor has a depreciated position in the asset, however, the
historical rules still apply, requiring an actual sale to realize the loss.
The constructive sale rules apply only where the investor holds an appreciated position in an
asset and then takes an offsetting short position-i.e., selling the asset-in a forward contract
or other derivative. A long position-i.e., buying more of the asset-does not justify
taxation. In the examples of this article, investors use forward contracts to increase their
exposure to assets they already own. Thus, the constructive-sale rules are not terribly
relevant to our current analysis.
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the additional risk she needs to offset the fifty percent tax on her gold.
Consistent with the model developed so far, payments received are income
and taxed at a rate of tax of fifty percent (or r in general terms). Payments
made under the contract are losses and receive symmetrical treatment.41
The forward contract is a convenient way to describe how a
counterparty could supply additional risk to Ophelia. The contract gives
Ophelia the same result as borrowing under the classic taxation of risk
model. Moreover, it involves only one transaction (the contract) rather than
two (a purchase and borrowing) and no necessary side effects (like her
counterparty's investment decisions). Indeed, Ophelia can enter into this
contract with anyone, whether or not that someone actually owns gold.
Forward contracts also give us a plausible basis for thinking that parties
could opt out without affecting the price of gold. Ophelia wants to buy
more gold but so do other taxable gold investors wanting to opt out. The tax
and resulting opt-out transactions appear to increase the demand for gold
and other risky assets. Without a plausible substitute (like forward
contracts), we would expect gold prices to go up.42
C. Analyzing Different Counterparties
1. A Similar Taxpayer Counterparty: Opt-Out Has No Effect on Fisc
Suppose Ophelia's risk supplier is another taxpayer also subject to a
fifty percent tax. She agrees to a cash-settled forward contract to pay $1020
for one ounce of gold, settled in one year. Her risk supplier takes a short
position on gold but takes no other actions (like buying gold) that could
affect its taxes. From the government's perspective, nothing at all has
happened, either when the parties enter the contract or when they settle. The
forward contract is simply a side bet between Ophelia and the other
taxpayer. 43 The government taxes one party's gains at fifty percent, but
grants an offsetting deduction to the other party for its losses. In this
scenario, the government is indifferent to the opt-out transaction. After
netting its exposure to the forward contract, the government still taxes the
gain or loss on Ophelia's gold.
41 If the underlying asset is capital in nature, then gains and losses should also be
capital. See SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at II.B.3.a. Their source as foreign or domestic turns on
the residence of the relevant taxpayer. See id. at II.B.4.
42 Cf supra part II.C.6 (assuming that the tax does not affect gold prices); cf Kaplow,
supra note 2 (same). Even with forward contracts, we might likely see an increase in prices.
A third party can enter into a short contract with Ophelia even if the third party does not own
gold. But, such third parties may strongly desire to hedge their risks by holding gold.
43 Cf supra part III (discussing side bets).
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As before, Ophelia is indifferent between the fifty percent income tax
and a wealth tax. The government is not. Under the income tax, the
government bears fifty percent of the gain or loss from gold. This is the
same result for the government had Ophelia not opted out in the first place.
2. Tax-Exempt Counterparty: Opt-Out Amplifies Government's Exposure
to Investment Risk
Assume now that Ophelia enters into a forward contract with a tax-
exempt counterparty (like a foreigner or a charity). The counterparty faces
no tax consequences on its side of the forward contract,44 but Ophelia does.
The opt-out transaction is no longer a wash from the government's
perspective. Rather than converting the income tax into a wealth tax,
though, the opt-out transaction amplifies the government's exposure to the
price of gold. Again, we assume Ophelia enters a one-year forward contract
to buy gold for $1020 but settling with cash.
* If gold goes up by fifty percent to $1500, Ophelia has a gain of
$500 from the physical gold and $480 from the forward
contract. Her tax-exempt counterparty has a $480 loss from the
forward contract, but the government grants it no tax benefit.
The government taxes the $500 of gain from Ophelia's physical
gold and $480 from the forward contract. Had Ophelia not
opted out, the government would tax only the $500 of gain.
* If gold goes down by fifty percent to $500, Ophelia has a loss of
$500 from the gold and $520 from the forward contract. Her
tax-exempt counterparty has a $520 gain from the forward
contract, but it pays no taxes. On a net basis, the government
grants a tax benefit to Ophelia based on the $500 from the
physical gold and $520 from the forward contract. Had Ophelia
not opted out, the government would grant a tax benefit based
solely on $500 of loss.
In rough terms, the opt-out transaction has doubled the government's
exposure to the risk of gold-price fluctuations. The outcomes to the
government are clearly different from a tax on Ophelia's initial wealth.
For the sake of completeness, consider three other scenarios. First,
Ophelia might find a counterparty that pays tax but at a lower rate. In that
case, our result would be somewhere between that of this subsection (tax-
exempt counterparty) and the prior (fully taxable counterparty). Second,
Ophelia might find a higher-rate counterparty. The next subsection,
The foreigner, for example, would have foreign source income, and would not pay
tax. See Livingston, supra note 34.
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however, considers what happens when Ophelia transacts with the
government itself, which we can think of as being a taxpayer subject to a
100% rate (i.e., all its gains and losses belong to the government).
3. The Government Itself: Opt-Out Converts Income Tax to Wealth Tax
The final case is when the government itself supplies the risk that
Ophelia wants. If the government itself acts as counterparty to Ophelia, then
it does indeed convert the income tax into a wealth tax.45 Assume that
Ophelia enters into a one-year forward contract to buy an ounce of gold
from the government for $1020.
* If gold goes up by fifty percent to $1500, Ophelia has gain of
$500 from the physical gold and $480 from the forward
contract. The government collects tax from her equal to $490.
The government has a loss under the forward contract equal to
$480. On a net basis, the government collects $10.
* If gold goes down by fifty percent to $500, Ophelia has a loss of
$500 from the gold and $520 from the forward contract.
Ophelia has a total loss of $1020, and the government grants her
a tax benefit equal to fifty percent of that, or $510. The
government collects $520 from the forward contract. On a net
basis, the government collects $10.
In both cases, the government collects a flat amount, equal to one
percent of Ophelia's starting wealth. Thus, if-but only if-the government
supplies Ophelia with the additional risk she demands, the government
converts the simple income tax into a wealth tax.46 The government could
directly tax Ophelia's wealth without the bother of the forward contract.47
The government could conversely convert a wealth tax into an income tax
45 David Weisbach and Louis Kaplow both acknowledge the role of government
adjustments in the equivalence argument. Thus, they assume that the government will enter
transactions that satisfy investor demands for additional risk.
46 This case also has the attractive feature that Ophelia's counterparty-the
government-has no obvious incentive to buy physical gold. We would expect no effect on
prices. See Kaplow, supra note 2.
47 In the United States, however, a federal wealth tax may be subject to constitutional
challenge. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff'd on
reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress had no constitutional
authority to levy a property tax or to tax the income from property. The 16th Amendment,
ratified eighteen years later, authorized Congress to tax income from property. U.S. CONST.,
amend. XVI. Whether Pollock would bar a federal tax on property or wealth today is
debatable. See Calvin H. Johnson, Purging Out Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal
Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97 TAx NOTES 1723, 1734 (2002); Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the
Sixteenth Amendment (by Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355 (2004).
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with forward contracting. 48
D. Evaluating the Equivalence Interpretation
Wealth and income taxes theoretically produce equivalent results as the
government could enter the market and supply Ophelia and other taxpayers
with the additional risk they want.49 As a practical matter, we should
question whether the government could enter the market to achieve actual
equivalence. The government faces scrutiny when investing and may feel
constrained to invest in enterprises that advance political rather than
economic interests. Moreover, the government may not be able to reach
every kind of investment. It can (and does) hold gold investments. It may
not so easily be able to invest in every type of investment (like real estate or
closely held businesses). Only by entering the market can the government
convert an income tax into a wealth tax (or vice versa), and there may be
significant frictions in doing so.
Even if the government could not effortlessly switch between wealth
and income taxes, the equivalence interpretation still has power. We could
draw an analogy by thinking of a private investor who is trying to decide
whether to invest $1 million in risky assets (like stocks) or less risky assets
(like bonds). Both portfolios have the same value, ex ante. One, though, has
more risk and potentially a higher return. The investor would need to
choose one that fits her personal needs the best. Similarly, a government
might choose between two forms of taxation. A wealth tax would produce a
low but stable source of revenue. An income tax would produce a higher,
more volatile source of revenue. Both have equivalent values in a financial
sense, but one might be better suited to funding government activities.
VI. THE SIMPLE TAX DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE AMONGST INVESTMENTS
OF VARYING RISK
Even if wealth and income taxes are not equivalent, the taxation of risk
model developed so far tells us something important about the simple
income tax. Not only may Ophelia opt out of taxes on gold, but the size and
cost of doing so do not depend on either the riskiness of gold or even its
expected return. We should consider this a feature, not a bug. When
choosing among assets (e.g., gold bullion or Google stock), the simple tax
48 The government would enter into (long) contracts to buy gold, exposing it to the risk
of increase or decrease in the price of gold.
49 Conversely, the government imposing a wealth tax does not capture the gain or loss
from private investment. It could, however, enter the private market to obtain, rather than
supply, risk. Doing so would effectively convert a wealth tax into an income tax.
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gives Ophelia no reason to prefer one over another. From her ex-ante
perspective, they have the same tax burden because the cost of the opt-out
transaction does not depend on their risk or even expected returns. Thus,
Ophelia's decision to invest in Google or gold is not distorted by the
idealized-tax system we described above.
This result may seem counter to the idea that the income tax applies to
outcomes. Risky investments not only lead to differing outcomes, but they
should have higher expected returns as well. 50 Risk-free assets earn a low
rate of return. Risky assets should, on an expected basis, earn an additional
risk premium. The taxation-of-risk model suggests that the risk premium-
the return from bearing risk-is not burdened with higher taxes.51
The explanation for this anomaly comes from examining the opt-out
transactions, in particular the forward-contract version.52 As described
above, the "fair" price to pay for gold, delivered in one year, is the current
price of gold plus interest. The fair price has nothing to do with the
expected returns on gold. Thus, an investor (so long as she is creditworthy)
can obtain the risk-and the risk premium-from gold simply by entering
into a forward contract. And, as we saw in part III, the income tax does not
burden side agreements like forward contracts.
This result is a manifestation of "risk-neutral valuation" that pervades
the theory of derivatives. When we value derivatives, we simply assume
that the underlying asset grows at the risk-free rate of return. We disregard
expected returns, risk premiums, risk preferences, and the like. As the
leading text on derivatives states, "[r]isk-neutral valuation is a very
important general result in the pricing of derivatives. It states that, when we
assume the world is risk-neutral, we get the right price for a derivative in all
worlds, not just in a risk-neutral one."54
Risk-neutral valuation extends directly to the income tax via the classic
model described above. The simple tax, discussed above, is essentially a
derivative contract between the government and the taxpayer. The
government does not really own the taxpayer's assets, but has a claim that
is derived from the asset's value and growth (or decline) over time. If the
asset goes up, the government takes a share of the growth. If asset goes
down, the government pays for some of the loss. According to risk-neutral
valuation, we value the government's claim assuming that assets grow at
the risk-free rate, a result completely consistent with the findings of this
5o See Zelenak, supra note 14, at 884-91.
st See id.
52 See supra part V.B.




article and prior scholars.
Characterizing the income tax as a derivative contract allows us to
interpret the classic taxation of risk model. According to risk-neutral
pricing, investors can freely obtain risk premiums without investing any
cash but by investing in derivatives. Our usual categories of capital and
labor do not seem to apply. The return on the derivatives contract is clearly
not a return from labor, but it is not a return on capital either because it does
not require capital at all. Our categories fail, and we see a form of income
that seems to go untaxed, at least from the perspective of private parties.
As we will see below, characterizing the income tax as a derivatives
contract gives us an enormously powerful tool. Until now, we have been
analyzing a simple tax that has normative appeal but no real-world
application. Calling the income tax a derivatives contract allows us to move
from the simple, classic taxation-of-risk model to more sophisticated
models that account for strategic behavior, responses to such behavior, and
alternative models of income taxation.
VII. TIMING OPTIONS CAUSE THE INCOME TAX TO FAVOR RISK
A. Timing Options and Loss Harvesting
We now begin to relax the assumptions specified in part II.C. In
particular, we will revisit the idea of a fixed holding period and a tax
imposed at its end. We continue to assume that the taxpayer still has an
economic holding period. At its end, the taxpayer will want to liquidate the
investment in order to fund consumption or another investment opportunity.
During the interim, the asset will either go up or down in value. If it goes up
in value during the interim, the taxpayer does nothing. If it goes down in
value, however, the taxpayer strategically capitalizes on the drop. She sells
the asset, triggers a taxable loss, and reinvests the proceeds immediately in
the same asset.55 Absent transaction costs and legal restrictions, the investor
has no reason not to trigger an immediate tax loss. This strategy, known as
"loss harvesting" exploits the "timing option" that the taxpayer holds when
deciding when to trigger gains and losses.
Commentators have previously noted the "timing option" and "loss
harvesting" opportunities from unfettered freedom to sell.56 U.S. tax law
combats loss harvesting by deferring loss deductions in certain situations. 57
In the United States, this strategy would not work for securities under the wash-sale
rules. See I.R.C. §1091.
56 See George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51
ECONOMETRICA 611 (1983).
5 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1091, 1211, & 1212.
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Allowing successful investors to recognize loss on losers while deferring
gain on the winners would threaten the fisc. However, the government
could respond simply by raising rates, although doing so could exacerbate
"lock in"-the phenomenon in which a taxpayer continues holding
suboptimal investments in order to avoid tax on previously accrued gains.
This part uses the taxation of risk model to identify another reason why
higher rates could not combat loss harvesting. The prior part argued that the
simple tax, developed earlier, is beneficially neutral with respect to risk.
Loss harvesting, however, threatens this neutrality because the timing
option is most valuable with respect to risky assets.
B. Refinancing the Opt-Out Transaction
Recall that the basic model has the investor borrow to finance an
additional purchase of the asset. If the investor starts with an asset worth So,
she must borrow r / (1 - r) So in order to fund the additional purchase. In
this part, it will be convenient to assume that the investor prepays her
interest on this loan every year using a rate of r*. Without harvesting,
prepaid annual interest comes from (10) by assuming T = 1. Annual prepaid
interest equals
(11) S.r.where r, = (1 - e-r)
Our investor will harvest losses at some intermediate time =j, if the
price at that time, S, falls belowSo. Loss harvesting is simply a sale at the
price of S, generating a taxable loss.
The classic model establishes that the opt-out transaction fully hedges
against tax consequences at any time. By selling at a loss, the investor gets
a tax benefit (a deduction) but must repay the principal on the loan she took
out with the initial opt-out transaction. The tax benefit. and the loan
repayment cancel. The investor is left with S, just as we would expect given
the design of the opt-out transaction. What, then, is the benefit of loss
harvesting under the taxation-of-risk model?
She still plans to hold the asset until some later time = T. The benefit of
harvesting comes when the investor reestablishes the new opt-out
transaction. Now she pays a lower amount of annual prepaid interest equal
to Sr.. In other words, the investor benefits with a lower annual cost on her
opt-out transactions after harvesting. Whenever the asset reaches a new
minimum price, the investor harvests the losses and forces ongoing opt-out
cost again.
Effectively, the timing option allows the investor to "look back" over
the asset performance since time = 0 to find the minimum price, Smin. This
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minimum price, not the initial price, establishes the cost of financing the
opt-out transaction for future periods. Thus, after the initial year (time = 0),
the annual cost of the opt-out transaction is
(12) Smin r.
The best (tax) case scenario for a loss harvester would be a temporary
dip in the asset price to some small amount. Suppose Ophelia buys gold
worth $1000. To opt out of a twenty percent tax, she must fund a $250
purchase of gold. Gold momentarily dips to $1 an ounce. She immediately
sells and reestablishes her opt-out transaction. Now, however, she needs to
fund a mere twenty-five cent purchase. Gold immediately goes back to its
prior price of $1000 per ounce. Ophelia has opted out of the twenty percent
tax, but her cost is based on financing the twenty-five cent purchase.
C. Comparing the Refinanced Cost to the Simple Model
Let us take the simple model as our baseline, the result that we ideally
would see under a realization-based tax. According to this baseline,
however, the cost of the opt-out transaction should be based on the initial
price, So, as described above in (11). Loss harvesting gives the investor a
lower cost, based on Smin, described in (12). The annual benefit from loss-
harvesting is the difference between these two amounts.
(13) [(SWo - Smi
This benefit has the same form as a so-called "look back" option.58
Identifying this form allows us to use an option-pricing model to value the
benefit from loss harvesting.
D. Relationship Between the Cost of Opting Out and Risk
Let us suppose that Ophelia has a true holding period of ten years for
an investment of $1000. She faces a twenty percent tax and can obtain
funds for an after-tax cost of two percent. Under the simple model
developed above, her prospective cost of opting out should be about $45.59
This cost does not depend on the investment that Ophelia chooses because
the simple tax does not discriminate based on risk.
To be more precise, the payoff is that of a fixed look-back put option. The strike
price is the initial price, So. See HULL, supra note 18, at 582-84.
59 See supra part IV.C.
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With loss harvesting, she can lower this cost. The amount by which she
lowers her cost, however, depends on how much investment risk she
undertakes. Risk, in financial terms, is simply volatility, a measure of
uncertainty regarding an asset's future value.60 A more volatile asset gives
Ophelia a better chance at a dip in price, allowing her to reestablish the opt-
out transaction at a low price. Of course, Ophelia would suffer from a dip,
but the higher volatility gives her more economic upside potential as well.
The prior section described loss harvesting as a look-back option,
letting the investor look back to a prior minimum price when setting the
basic opt-out transaction. The following graph shows how these look-back
options lower the cost of the opt-out transaction as investment risk increases
from 0 to 1.0.61 The top horizontal line represents the cost of the opt-out
transaction without harvesting, a flat line of about $45. The lower curve
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The graph shows a steep decline in the expected cost of the opt-out
transaction as she takes on more risk.62 Thus, loss harvesting not only
lowers government revenue. It distorts investment choices, causing
60 See HULL, supra note 18, at 811.
61 Investment risk here is measured by standard deviations. Risk of "1.0" is 100%
standard deviation.
62 The graph relies on some assumptions about the frequency of loss harvesting and the
frequency of resetting the opt-out transaction. In particular, I assume that the investor can
always lock in a lower price at any time the stock falls below a prior minimum. But, the
investor must wait to lower her annual cost from the opt-out transaction until the start of the
next period. So, the cost of the opt-out transaction for the first year (from time = 0 to time =
1) is fixed and cannot be changed. The cost of the opt-out transaction for the second year
(from time = 1 to time = 2) is based on the minimum price of the asset over the first year.
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investors to prefer more risky assets.
VIII. Loss LIMITATIONS COMBAT HARVESTING BUT CAUSE THE INCOME
TAX TO DISFAVOR RISK
A. Loss Limitations
U.S. tax law responds to loss harvesting by limiting the ability of
investors to deduct losses. Investors can always deduct capital losses
against capital gains. But, they cannot always use capital losses to reduce
other income. Under I.R.C. § 1211, individuals can deduct only $3000 of
losses that remain after netting against gains. After the $3000 deduction,
remaining losses carry forward to later taxable years indefinitely until
used.63 Corporations do not enjoy the $3000 deduction and can carry excess
losses forward for only five years.64
U.S. law also contains a set of "wash-sale rules" that disallows a loss
on stock or securities if the investor acquires "substantially identical stock
or securities" thirty days before or after the day the loss was harvested. So,
the investor could replace the investment thirty-one days after loss
harvesting, going thirty days without the investment, or the investor could
preemptively replace the investment thirty-one days before harvesting,
going thirty days with double the investment.65 Conceptually, U.S. law
disrupts the investor's preferred asset allocation as a price of harvesting the
loss.
Capturing the effects of these loss limitations is difficult. The wash-
sale rules disrupt the investor's investment strategy, but it is difficult to put
a price on this disruption. As for the limits of section 1211, their effect
depends on the investor's overall portfolio and whether it produced gains in
a particular year. Some investors can use losses, but some cannot.
B. Modeling Complete Disallowance
The prior part modeled extreme loss harvesting. Whenever the asset
price hit a new low, the taxpayer could lower the cost of the opt-out
transaction. This section does something similar with loss limitations,
assuming that losses produce no tax benefit at all. Thus, the government
effectively holds an option on the investor's asset. If the asset goes up in
63 See I.R.C. § 1212(b).
See I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1)(B). Corporations do have one advantage over individuals,
though, as they can carry loss back to the three prior taxable years. See I.R.C. §
1212(a)(1)(A).
65 See I.R.C. § 1091.
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value, the government taxes the gain. If the asset goes down in value, the
government bears none of the loss.
The investor could try to opt out of this harsher tax by buying her own
option in the private market. The option would offset the tax but would
itself subject the investor to tax if the asset grows enough in value. The
investor could buy a second option to cover tax on the first option. In
theory, this process would go on infinitely, but three or four options will
probably suffice for practical purposes.66
The following graph shows how the opt-out transaction increases in
cost as the risk of the investment rises. As before, we assume a ten year
holding period, a twenty percent tax, a two percent after-tax interest rate,
and a $1000 initial investment. The simple model yields a flat cost of $45,
regardless of risk. Now, the cost increases dramatically. Even at relatively
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66 A detailed example follows:
Suppose the investor has $1000, buys an asset with volatility/risk of 30%, expects to hold it
for 10 years, faces a 20% tax rate on gains, and has the ability to borrow at an after-tax rate
of 2%. As we have seen before, the simple model points to an opt-out cost of about $45. The
cost is much higher with complete loss disallowance. Option-pricing models assume that
assets grow at the risk-free rate. After-tax, we would expect a growth rate of 2%. The $1000
should grow to about $1221 after tax with continuous compounding. A before-tax growth
rate of 2.44% produces the same result, provided the tax applies at realization.
To hedge against the tax on her asset, the investor buys a call option on the asset that pays if
the asset increases in value. Using the assumptions so far, the option price is about $443, but
the investor needs only 20% of this option for a cost of about $89. If the asset grows more
than $443 dollars, however, the first option produces gain. So, the investor must buy a
second option with a strike price of $1443. This second option price is about $326, but the
investor only needs 4% of this option (20% of the first option which covers 20% of the
asset). The cost of the second option is about $13. So far, the overall cost is about $102. We
could continue opting out indefinitely, although successive options become less and less
significant. The third option would cost about $2, and the fourth would cost less than 50
cents. We can safely say that the cost of opting out is pretty close to $104.
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C. Interpreting the Model
The graph overstates the impact of loss limitations as it assumes no tax
benefit for losses. U.S. tax law, however, forces investors to match their
capital losses against capital gains. Thus, losses are deferred until the
investor has a matching capital gain. Still, deferral does reduce the value of
losses. Some investors may never be able to use their losses, particularly if
the overall market declines. Loss limitations inevitably burden some
investors, even if the model overstates the burden.
Moreover, the model shows that policymakers could be overzealous in
combating loss harvesting, the primary reason for limiting losses in the first
place. The following graph combines the prior two, suggesting that the
burdens from complete loss disallowance exceed the benefits from extreme
loss harvesting. Again, we have an investor with $1000 facing a twenty
percent tax, a ten year holding period, and two percent after-tax interest
rate. The horizontal line is the flat $45 cost of opting out of the simple
model. The curve below represents unrestrained loss harvesting, showing
the cost diminishes as risk increases. The curve above represents complete




02 0.4 06 0.8 1.0
Earlier, this article argued that the simple tax does not discriminate
based on risk, a normatively desirable feature. We see now how tax-
motivated selling (loss harvesting) encourages risk taking, but policy
responses (loss limitations) discourage risk taking. The policy goal should
be to discourage loss harvesting with the least possible distortion on risk
taking. Policymakers could "solve" the problem if they abandon taxing
capital altogether by shifting to a consumption tax. Another extreme
solution would be to tax capital appreciation or depreciation on a year-to-
year basis, even if not recognized. The next part shows how the taxation of
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risk model extends to such an accretion tax.
IX. THE MODEL EXTENDS TO ACCRETION (OR MARKED-TO-MARKET)
SYSTEMS OF TAXATION
A. The Allure ofAccretion Taxation
An accretion tax would tax gains and recognize losses according to
movements in asset prices. In other words, the tax would be imposed on a
"marked-to-market" basis. This method finds favor among tax law
academics67 and applies to a few types of financial instruments under U.S.
law, like futures contracts. Several scholars have proposed regimes that
would tax gains, especially those on publicly traded assets, on a "marked-
to-market" basis.69 Supporters justify these regimes by showing they
achieve equity between returns on capital and income. Capital appreciation
gives the holder power and wealth, intangible benefits that are themselves
much like consumption.70
In this part, I extend the classic taxation-of-risk model to accretion
taxes. Two results will stand out. First, accretion taxes are neutral as to risk,
just like the simple tax developed above. Investors who wish to opt out of
the accretion tax face a significant constraint, however, as they must pre-
commit to some specific holding peridd. Second, the model may undermine
some of the fairness rationales that support accretion tax. Investors could
convert an accretion tax into a fixed charge on starting wealth, just as they
can with a realization based tax. Thus, the accretion tax may not burden
investors who achieve greater wealth and power over their holding periods.
B. Opting Out of an Accretion Tax
1. The Goal of Opting Out
Remember Ophelia and her ounce of gold, currently worth $1000.71
Opting out of a realization tax was fairly straightforward, and we could
even be a bit casual about how she goes about it. She would borrow funds
to buy more gold, and she could borrow without any set time period. She
See generally BORIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 3.5.2 (2012).
68 See I.R.C. § 1256.
69 See BITIKER & LoKKEN, supra note 66, 3.5.2 n.4.
70 See Jeff Stmad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99
YALE L.J. 1817 (1990).
71 See supra part III.
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might prepay interest, pay interest periodically, or pay at the end of her
holding period. Opting out of the accretion tax is technically more difficult.
Our goal, as before, is to offset the tax, but now the tax is imposed
repeatedly over the holding period.
Under this accretion tax, we will need to be more precise in the method
and goals of opting out. In a tax-free world, Ophelia would start with one
ounce of gold and end with one ounce of gold. Let us define her goal as
having wealth worth one ounce of gold at the end of some holding period,
after paying all taxes. Ophelia simply needs to know how much gold to start
with. If she had a one-year holding period, the answer is supplied already.
With an after-tax interest rate of two percent and a tax rate of twenty
percent, Ophelia must start with about 1.005 ounces of gold using (10) If
gold costs $1000 per ounce, she would have to pay $1005 for an ounce of
gold, after tax, in one year.
2. Opting Out of Multiple Years
We know how to opt out of a one-year tax-buy 1.005 ounces of gold.
Extending the opt out to several years means that we simply work
backwards. Suppose Ophelia has a two-year holding period:
* Year 2: Ophelia wants 1 ounce of gold at this time.
* Year 1: At this time, Ophelia wants to be in a position to hold 1
ounce of gold in one year. So, Ophelia needs 1.005 ounces of
gold to produce 1 ounce of gold in the course of a year.
* Year 0 (today): Ophelia wants to be in a position to hold 1.005
ounces of gold in one year. To achieve this goal, she needs
about 1.010 ounces of gold.
We can generalize this result for any interest rate, tax rate, and holding
period. Our taxpayer defines a unit of wealth at some time in the future, T
years from now. The unit might be anything-an ounce of gold, 312 shares
of Google common stock, or a balanced portfolio of stock and equity. Let
us define that unit as St. The question is how many units does she need
today to produce one unit in the future. Since we know the price today is So,
we can convert the units required today into monetary terms.
The details of this work are left to the Appendix. We express the
interest as a pre-tax rate, R. Assuming that taxes apply continuously (i.e.,
whenever the asset moves in price), this leads to a more "elegant" result that
also relates to prior work on retrospective taxes.72 The model easily handles
annual taxes.73 By properly opting out, the investor starts with the amount
72 See infra part IX.B.3.
7 Cf Stmad, supra note 69 (arguing that continuous-time taxation is the theoretical
Extending the Taxation-of-Risk Model
on the left of the arrow and ends with the after-tax amount on the right, her
identified goal.
(14) e"'So ST
We could say that the prospective cost of opting out for T years is
given by
(1 5) So (e] "'- 1
Following the financial crisis, elegant models smell of fiction if not
danger.74 Yet unlike the financial models of Wall Street, the relationship
given above does not turn on any assumptions about how asset returns are
distributed. The Black-Scholes model of option-pricing assumes that prices
follow a normal or Gaussian distribution,7 5 but the relationship above is
completely agnostic as to the movement of asset prices.
More fundamentally, the relationship is not even offered to represent
our actual system of taxation. It clearly does not. Instead, it represents the
theoretical ideal of Haig-Simons taxation, at least under a flat rate of tax.
The assumption of continuous-time taxation significantly deviates from the
Haig-Simons expectation of annual taxation. As Professor Jeff Stmad notes,
there is no normative reason for the "periodicity" of taxes to be determined
by the Earth's orbit around the Sun.76 Haig-Simons points to taxation on a
more frequent basis than we see under a realization standard. If annual taxes
are better than realization taxes, then monthly taxes must be better still.
Theoretically, then, continuous taxes-applied instantly when prices
move-are best of all.
3. Retrospective Cost and the Auerbach Tax
We can equivalently view the accretion tax as causing an asset to
experience a fixed rate of decay in value over time. An asset worth So today
will be worth something less than ST at time = T. According to (14), the
asset takes the following path:
ideal).
74 Cf e.g., Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street,
WIRED MAG.(Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/ wp quant
(criticizing the "Gaussian copula" model used to model credit risk).
7 Cf NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2008) (criticizing use of Gaussian
assumption in finance).
76 See Stmad, supra note 69.
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(16) So = eRI(e-"RSo) - e-TrST
Along the same lines, we could value the retrospective cost of opting
out of the accretion tax. At time = T, the investor has the amount described
in (16). Absent taxes she would have ST. The difference between the two is
the retrospective cost opting out:
(17) 5 T - e "'ST = (1 - e~)ST
More than twenty years ago, economist Alan J. Auerbach proposed a
"retrospective capital gains" tax that, while levied only upon realization, is
nevertheless financially equivalent to accretion taxation.77 According to
Auerbach, his tax offers the best of all worlds. It avoids the advantages of
deferral and the problems of "lock in" associated with realization-based
taxes. Because the Auerbach tax is imposed on realization, it avoids the
liquidity and valuation difficulties inherent in taxing assets on an annual
basis.
Computationally, the Auerbach tax is exactly the same as the
retrospective cost in (17).78 Suppose that taxes are twenty percent, the
holding period is ten years, and the before-tax interest rate is 2.5%. An
investor who sells an asset worth $1000 at the end of 10 years would then
pay tax of about $49. The Auerbach tax is financially equivalent to an
accretion tax, at least in the sense that a wealth tax is equivalent to an
income tax.79
Note that the Auerbach tax clashes with what might be called "tax
system aesthetics."80 The Auerbach tax does not depend on the amount of
gain and applies even if there is a loss. If the investor bought for $2000 but
sold for $1000, she would still pay the Auerbach tax. The tax depends on
(1) the price received for the asset (or the "amount realized" under the U.S.
tax code), (2) the interest rate, (3) the holding period, and (4) the tax rate.
What is interesting is that the Auerbach tax is functionally equivalent to
accretion taxation under the extended taxation of risk model.
7 See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
167 (1991).
78 See id. at 170.
7 But cf supra part V (discussing equivalence between income and wealth taxes).
so See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46
STAN. L. REv. 569, 592 (1994) (referring to "tax system aesthetics").
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C. Essential Differences Between Realization and Accretion Taxation
1. Holding Periods
In order to opt-out of the accretion tax, an investor must pre-commit to
a specific holding period. A transaction that works for ten years would not
work for five years or fifteen years. This is not to say that the investor has
any legal duty to hold for the pre-committed period. It is to say, though, that
a particular opt-out transaction works only for a particular holding period.
For example, suppose an investor faces a twenty percent tax, a two
percent after-tax interest rate (2.5% before tax), and plans for a ten-year
holding period. Her initial holding of the asset, So, must be increase to about
1.05127 x So. At time = 10, she would be assured of having S1o. If she
wanted to continue holding the asset, she certainly could. She could even
"opt out" of taxes again, but her cost would be based on SIo, not on So. If
she held until time = 5, she would have 1.02532 xS5. From her perspective,
she has devoted "too much" of her initial wealth to the asset. A smaller
initial investment would have produced S.
In contrast, the simple tax modeled at the beginning of this article had
flexible holding periods. The investor could gross up at time = 0 and pay a
flat annual interest charge to do so. The investor could abandon the
transaction at any time = j and be assured of having exactly S. Indeed, the
holding period of the simple tax is too flexible as it allows investors to
engage in loss harvesting.
This idea is related to the timing options discussed earlier. Under a
realization based tax, the investor chooses when to face the tax
consequences of gain or loss. She can be flexible, accelerating loss or
deferring gain as she likes with a flexible holding period. The accretion tax
removes this flexibility. To opt out, the investor must identify a holding
period ahead of time.
2. Magnitude of Burdens
The potential burdens of accretion taxes are greater than those of the
simple tax. The prospective cost of opting out of the simple tax is81
(18) S(1 - e -
The comparable cost for the accretion tax is82
81 See Equation (10).
82 See Equation (15)0.
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For short holding periods, the differences may not seem too great.
Suppose that the after-tax interest rate, r, is two percent, and the tax rate is
twenty percent. The before-tax interest rate, R, is 2.5%. Our investor holds
an asset worth $1000. To opt out of the accretion tax costs about $51. To
opt out of the realization-based tax costs about $45.
Over longer periods, however, the differences become much greater.
Under the realization based tax, the investor is sure that she needs no more
than $250 for a permanent exemption from a twenty percent tax. That is the
maximum cost of the opt out as T or r grows. In contrast, the cost for the
accretion tax has no maximum amount. The cost grows without bounds as
holding periods and interest rates increase. A supporter of limited
government might find the realization-based tax appealing because it caps
the government's share of wealth in a way that the accretion tax fails to do.
The following chart compares the prospective cost of opting out of the
two different taxes. As before, the investor has $1000 to invest and faces a
twenty percent tax and a two percent after-tax interest rate. The vertical is
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We might interpret these two curves as representing acceptable
boundaries for taxing capital income. The top curve represents an
instantaneous accretion tax, applied whenever the investment moves in
value. The bottom curve represents realization, applied whenever an asset is
sold but not before. What is interesting is that, for even moderately long
holding periods like ten years, the choice does not appear consequential.
Only for long holding periods, such as twenty or more years, do the two
approaches begin to diverge dramatically.
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D. Fairness and Accretion Taxation
The accretion tax has obvious efficiency advantages over the
realization-based tax. The ex-ante cost of opting out of the accretion tax is
fixed. In contrast, realization-based taxes are plagued by timing options or
loss limitations that distort investors' choices. Moreover, many assets
produce annual yields, such as dividends and interest. All returns on
property are taxed annually under accretion. In contrast, even under
realization-based taxes, annual yields are taxed annually, often at higher
rates.
Many tax scholars argue that accretion taxation is fairer than realization
taxation. Accretion taxes put capital and employment income on an equal
footing, taxing both annually. Several scholars, however, argue that the
government should not tax returns on capital at all, taxing instead
consumption. Professor Jeff Strnad links accretion taxation to consumption-
tax ideals. He argues that increases in wealth give their holders power,
prestige, and enjoyment. Wealth is, in effect, a form of consumption, even
if it is not spent.
Professor Stmad argues that only accretion taxes effectively reach
these changes in wealth. Indeed, the government has no principled reason to
tax wealth changes only annually. It could tax them more frequently,
perhaps even continuously. This part models an accretion tax that does just
that. Nevertheless, it shows that investors can still opt out of this regime,83
converting the accretion tax into an up-front fixed payment. Accretion taxes
may not have fairness advantages over realization taxes.
X. CONCLUSION
The classic taxation-of-risk model might not accomplish what past
scholars have suggested. Unless the government actively facilitates the
conversion, income taxes and wealth taxes are inherently different from the
perspective of the fisc. From the perspective of private parties, though, they
might be equivalent. For this reason, we can say that a simple tax does not
distort investment choices between various classes of risky assets.
The model, at its core, describes the income tax -as a derivatives
contract. The government has a claim against taxpayers that "derives" from
the value of their holdings. This observation opens up the income tax to
Professor Strnad, while praising the cleverness of the Auerbach tax, finds that it
does not satisfy his ideals of taxing changes in wealth. According to Professor Strnad, an
accretion tax, applied instantly to changes in wealth, satisfies his ideals. This part shows that
the Auerbach tax and the accretion tax, applied in continuous time, are functionally
equivalent, at least from the perspective of investors.
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powerful analytical tools from option pricing models. We can now account
for strategic behavior (timing options) and government responses to
strategic behavior (loss limitations). In both cases, we see distortions from
the simple model. Timing options distort in favor of seeking risk, while loss
limitations distort in favor of avoiding risk.
Finally, the model can extend beyond the simple realization based tax
to proposals for marked-to-market or accretion taxation. Investors can
effectively opt out of those taxes if they know their holding period ahead of
time. This observation gives us two results. First, we can prospectively
value accretion taxes and compare them to realization taxes. Second, we
should question whether accretion taxes effectively reach annual (or more
frequent) changes in asset values, as proponents suggest.
APPENDIX
I. INTRODUCTION
This Appendix formalizes the model for accretion taxes. As throughout
the article, S is the value of some asset at time = j, T is the holding period, r
is the tax rate, and r is the after-tax cost of funds (either from borrowing or
liquidating cash). We will generally assume borrowing. It is convenient also
to use the before-tax cost of funds, R = r / (1 - r).
II. SINGLE PERIOD OPT OUT
This section describes the simple-tax model with a view toward
applying the model to the accretion tax. It is slightly different from the
presentation in part IV as it begins with annual interest rates. Doing so
allows the next section to shift to continuous time.
Today (time = 0) an investor plans on having an asset worth S, in one
year (time = 1) after tax. This is the result in a tax-free world. In a taxable
world the investor achieves this goal by both increasing in her initial
investment with an out of pocket contribution and borrowing.84 According
to (4)
(20) 
- S. + so
The right side of the arrow shows the investor's goal of S plus an
additional term, T / (1 - T) So. To drop the additional term, assume the
investor borrows funds so that she repays T / (1 - T) So at time = 1. This
8 See supra part IV.
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repayment leaves her with S, at time = 1, the stated goal. The initial
borrowing that leads to this repayment comes from dividing the repayment
by (1 + r) or by (1 + R (1 -r)) if we use before-tax rates. So, the initial out-
of-pocket investment equals the grossed-up holdings(the left side of the
arrow in (20)) less the initial borrowing. We have the following single-
period path leading to Si:
(21) oso S1 -T (1-T) (1 + R(1 -T))
Simplifying the left side leads to the following:
(22) .1+R
1 +R(1 -T)
III. MULTIPLE PERIOD OPT OUT
Unlike the simple realization-based tax, an accretion tax applies
periodically. The investor cannot opt out of taxation by extending her
borrowings over multiple periods. To opt out of two periods of accretion,
the investor applies the process of the prior section repeatedly. A two period
opt out transaction leads to the following two steps.
(23) 1R 2So1. 5+ S)1+R(1-T) 1+R(I-T)
Generalizing to T periods yields the following.
(24) (so S1+ R (1 - T
The path in (24) describes how an investor would opt out of an
accretion tax imposed annually. Notice how we simply determine a factor
that is multiplied against So.
IV. CONTINUOUS TIME
Financial economics often calculates interest using continuous
compounding. Taxes, in contrast, apply annually. The justification for doing
so is administrative. Normatively, annual accounting leads to small
anomalies. Gain on January 1 is not taxed for more than a year. Gain on
December 31 is taxed within a few months. Ideally, an accretion tax would
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apply instantly whenever an asset went up or down in value. Following
standard convention, we divide each year into n sub-periods. As the sub-




(25) lim n _ eaTr
Based on (25), we can specify the initial investment required to achieve
final wealth of ST under continuous accretion taxation.
(26) SeT3 S
Alternatively, we can show how an initial asset So changes over a
period of time under continuous accretion taxation.
7 So ST e -
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(27)
